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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is our nation’s landmark 
environmental protection statute.  It is a bold commitment to preserving 
endangered and threatened species.  However, protecting vulnerable 
species is not without costs to governmental agencies and landowners.  
These economic and efficiency costs have made the law controversial.  
This article will avoid the question of the relative merits of the law; 
instead, it will focus on the law’s ability to protect not only endangered 
and threatened species, but also unlisted species that are in decline through 
innovative programs to protect habitat. 
To lay the groundwork for understanding the ESA’s ability to 
prevent species from becoming threatened in the first instance; this article 
will start with an introduction to the ESA.  It will then identify some of the 
problems landowners have faced under the original strict implementation 
of the law.  Next, it will address the new programs the federal government 
has developed to provide greater flexibility in the law through stakeholder 
participation in voluntary conservation agreements.  Finally, it will 
suggest incremental advancements in the law and its implementing 
regulations to further protect vulnerable species and the habitat they rely 
upon. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The ESA was passed as a reaction to the alarming number of 
species that had become extinct during the rapid expansion of the nation.  
In the 1970s, when the law was enacted, at least one species per year was 
going extinct and the number was accelerating.
1
  The growth of the 
environmental movement and public outrage over the loss of these species 
caused Congress to act.  Believing that biodiversity held unknown 
 
 1. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978). 
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scientific and medical benefits for humankind, Congress passed the ESA 
in 1973 to act as a “road block” in the path of future extinctions.
2
  The law 
was intended to be overly prescriptive to account for the lack of scientific 
certainty in the rate and causes of the decline in species populations.
3
  
Although the concept was common in Europe at the time, this was one of 
the first expressions of the “precautionary principle” in American law.  
Briefly stated, the precautionary principle ensures that when there is 
scientific uncertainty about the effect of a proposed action, policy makers 
should pursue the most conservative option possible.
4
  Basically, it is 
better to prevent the decline of a species than it is to try to recover a 
depleted population caused by a mistake. 
A. ESA § 2 – Purpose 
The stated purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such 
endangered species and threatened species.”
5
  Five years after the law’s 
enactment, the Supreme Court stated, “the language, history, and structure 
of [the ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered 
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”
6
  Despite the nation’s 
desire to make protecting vulnerable species our highest priority, the ESA 
has had little substantive impact; instead, the law lays out the procedural 
requirements that a federal agency must comply with before it can act.
7
 
The Interior Department’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
and the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the 
Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 279, 285 (1997–
1998). 
 4. James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A 
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global 
Environment, 14 B.C. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991). 
 5. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
 6. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 174. 
 7. Martha F. Phelps, Candidate Conservation Agreements Under the 
Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 175, 178 (1997). 
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(NMFS) co-administer the ESA.
8
  The FWS
9
 has primary responsibility 
for terrestrial and freshwater organisms, while the NMFS is responsible 
for marine wildlife and anadromous fish such as whales and salmon.
10
 
B. ESA § 4 – Listing a species as endangered or threatened 
A species may be listed as either endangered or threatened.  An 
endangered species is one that is in danger of extinction throughout all or 
a significant portion of its range.
11
  A threatened species is one that is 
likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.
12
  Even if a 
species as a whole is doing well, a distinct population segment may be 
listed if it meets the statutory criteria.
13
  Listing a species is the threshold 
event that triggers the protections of the ESA.
14
  Once listed, a species is 
broadly protected from “harm.”
15
  This makes the decision to list 
“critically important because it sets in motion the [ESA’s] other 
provisions.”
16
  The listing decision is based on five criteria: 
 
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of [the species’] habitat or range; (B) 
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) 
 
 8. FWS, ESA Basics: 40 Years of Conserving Endangered Species 1 (Jan. 
2013) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf) 
[hereinafter FWS, ESA Basics]. 
 9. Unless noted otherwise, this article will use FWS to refer to both the 
FWS and the NMFS. 
 10. Chad W. Lamer, Habitat Conservation Plans: Balancing the 
Endangered Species Act’s Protections of Threatened and Endangered Species while 
Providing Landowners with Options for the Development of Land Containing Critical 
Habitat Areas, 18 Penn. St. Envtl. L. Rev. 25, 26 (2009–2010). 
 11. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012). 
 12. Id. at § 1532(20). 
 13. ESA Basics, supra n. 8, at 1. 
 14. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (2013). 
 15. Id. at § 17.3 (Harm is defined as “an act which actually kills or injures 
wildlife.  Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where 
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”). 
 16. S. Rep. No. 418, at 10 (1982). 
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other natural or manmade factors affecting [the species’] 
continued existence.
17
 
 
Additionally, the ESA instructs the FWS to consider efforts made 
by states, foreign nation, or Indian tribe to protect the species when 
making a listing decision.
18
  Although it may consider these conservation 
efforts, Congress specifically forbade the FWS from considering the 
economic impacts of listing the species.
19
  If the agency finds that listing a 
species as threatened or endangered is warranted based on one or more of 
the five factors, the agency must list the species.
20
 
The FWS also maintains a list of “candidate” species for which it 
has sufficient information to warrant listing, but that it is precluded from 
listing at the time because of limited financial resources or the presence of 
higher priority species.
21
  Listing a species as warranted but precluded 
“encourage[s] Federal agencies and other appropriate parties to take these 
taxa into account in environmental planning.”
22
 
C. ESA § 6 – Cooperation with the States 
In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Geer v. Connecticut 
that state governments have the sole authority to regulate wildlife within 
their borders.
23
  However, over time, this exclusive authority has eroded.  
In 1900, Congress passed the Lacey Act that made it illegal to transport 
illegally killed wildlife across state lines.
24
  In 1918, Congress enacted the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which implemented the 1916 Migratory Bird 
Treaty between the United States, Mexico, and Great Britain.
25
  This law 
made it illegal to kill certain listed species of birds that crossed state or 
 
 17. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). 
 18. Id. at § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
 19. H.R. Rpt. 97–567 at 20 (May 17, 1982). 
 20. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c). 
 21. Id. at § 424.02(b). 
 22. Annual Notice of Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 554 (Jan. 6,1989). 
 23. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378. 
 25. Id. at §§ 703–712.  Canada was not an independent nation at the time 
and was still part of Great Britain. 
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international boundaries.
26
  At that time, federal control of migratory birds 
was acceptable because they were viewed as sui generis based on their 
international range.
27
  Since then, as part of the general expansion of 
federal powers, the federal government has asserted more power to 
regulate wildlife; however, it still does not have plenary power to regulate 
all wildlife within the nation.
28
  That is why the ESA includes a section 
directing the FWS to cooperate with state governments to achieve the goal 
of preventing extinctions.
29
Without voluntary cooperation, the FWS 
would have no tools to prevent a species from declining to the point where 
it must be listed. 
Section 6 directs FWS to cooperate with states to the maximum 
extent practicable to conserve both listed and unlisted species.
30
  It allows 
states to enter into agreements for the administration and management of 
endangered or threatened species within their borders.
31
  This is an 
example of cooperative federalism where national policy is set by the 
 
 26. Id. at § 703(a) (“Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as 
hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means 
or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, 
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver 
for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver 
for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or 
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, 
nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which 
consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg 
thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great 
Britain . . . .”). 
 27. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (“Here a national interest 
of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.  It can be protected only by national 
action in concert with that of another power.  The subject-matter is only transitorily 
within the State and has no permanent habitat therein.  But for the treaty and the 
statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.  We see nothing in 
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off 
and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.  It is not sufficient to rely 
upon the States.  The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether 
the United States is forbidden to act.  We are of opinion that the treaty and statute 
must be upheld.”). 
 28. George Cameron Coggins and William H. Hensley, Constitutional 
Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species 
Act Endangered, 61 Iowa L. Rev. 1099, 1136 (1976). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 1535. 
 31. Id. at § 1535(b). 
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federal government and individual states are allowed to achieve the goal in 
a way that best suits its citizens.
32
  The authority for states to enter into 
collaborative stewardship agreements is important because they retain 
management authority over candidate species until they are listed.
33
  This 
creates an incentive for states to maintain at least the status quo of a 
species. 
D. ESA § 7 – Inter Federal Agency Consultation 
Although Section 7 is a procedural section and does not provide 
any substantive protections, it “provides some of the most valuable and 
powerful tools to conserve listed species, assist with species’ recovery, 
and help protect critical habitat.”
34
  Section 7(a)(2) requires all federal 
agencies to ensure that a proposed action will not jeopardize the existence 
of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of its 
critical habitat by consulting with the FWS before the agency authorizes, 
funds, or carries out any action.
35
  In fulfilling this requirement, the 
agency must use the best scientific and commercial data available.
36
 
To respond to an agency’s request for consultation, the FWS 
produces a biological opinion detailing how the agency’s proposed course 
that of action will affect the species and its critical habitat.
37
  If it finds the 
action will jeopardize a species or adversely modify its habitat, the FWS 
must suggest reasonable alternatives to the agency’s preferred course of 
action that would reduce the amount of harm to the species.
38
  Unlike 
during a listing decision, the FWS may consider the economic impacts of 
 
 32. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1328; Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; and Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7401–7626 for other examples of statutes using cooperative federalism. 
 33. 16 U.S.C. § 1535. 
 34. Final ESA Section 7 Consultation Handbook 1–1 (Mar. 1998) (available 
at http://www.fws.govendangeredesa-librarypdfesa_section7_handbook.pdf). 
 35. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a)(2). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at § 1535(a)(3)(A). 
 38. FWS, Endangered Species Consultation Handbook: Procedures for 
Conducting Consultation and Conference under Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act (Mar. 1998) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/
esa_section7_handbook.pdf). 
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the alternatives it proposes.
39
  To ensure that an agency does not attempt 
to act first and ask for forgiveness later, the section also prevents an 
agency from making an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of 
resources before it has obtained the FWS’s biological opinion.
40
 
E. ESA § 9 – Prohibited Acts 
Section 9 is the teeth of the ESA.
41
  It makes it unlawful for a 
person to “take” a listed species without a permit and imposes criminal 
and civil punishments for doing so.
42
  The act defines “take” as “to harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt 
to engage in any such conduct.”
43
  The term “harm” is defined as “an act 
which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife [including] significant 
habitat modification or degradation.”
44
 
Because of the harsh punishments possible for running afoul of 
Section 9, it is the stick that the FWS uses to entice landowners to enter 
into the voluntary conservation agreements.
45
  However, at times the FWS 
 
 39. Pamela Baldwin, The Endangered Species Act: Consideration of 
Economic Factors 5 (Cong Research Serv. April 15, 2003) (available at http://
www.law.umaryland.edu/marshallcrsreportscrs/documents/RL30792_04152003.pdf) 
(“Therefore, although economic factors are not to be considered in the listing of a 
species as endangered or threatened, economic factors must be considered when 
deciding whether and where to designate critical habitat, and some habitat areas may 
be excluded from designation based on such concerns, unless the failure to designate 
the habitat would result in the extinction of the subject species.”). 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d). 
 41. Id. at §1538. 
 42. Id. at §1538(a)(1) (“Except as provided in sections 1535 (g)(2) and 1539 
of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant 
to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States to . . . (B) take any such species within the United States or the 
territorial sea of the United States . . . .”). 
 43. Id. at § 1532(19). 
 44. 50 C.F.R. § 222.102. 
 45. Kirsten Uchitel, Pece and Cooperative Conservation: Innovation or 
Subversion under the Endangered Species Act?, 26 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. L. 
233, 262 (2006) (noting that under the second Bush Administration the FWS preferred 
to use  incentives such as “cooperation, innovation, and entrepreneurship” rather than 
“sticks”— “fees, fines and punishment as the primary tools with which to achieve 
environmental results.”); Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293 (“The first prosecution for a 
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has lacked the will or political capital to prosecute violations of the 
ESA.
46
  At other times, violators have received punishments equal to or 
less than the cost of entering into the conservation agreements that Section 
9 should encourage.
47
  When the punishment for violating Section 9 is 
less than the costs of not violating the law, there is little incentive for 
landowners to take proactive steps to avoid taking endangered species. 
F. ESA § 10 – Exceptions 
Section 10(a) allows the FWS to issue permits for the incidental 
take of a species that would otherwise be prohibited by section 9.
48
  In 
order to obtain an incidental take permit (ITP) the applicant must prove (i) 
the take will be incidental to a lawful activity, (ii) the applicant will to the 
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts on the 
species, (iii) that it has an adequate source of funding, and (iv) issuing the 
permit will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and 
recovery of the species in the wild.
49
 
Congress added this section in response to the Palila decisions, 
wherein the full extent of acts that may result in a “take,” and be enjoined 
under Section 9, was revealed.
50
  In Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t. of Land & 
Natural Resources, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the 
state of Hawaii allowed wild sheep to destroy the Palila’s (an endangered 
bird) designated critical habitat, that action constituted a take under the 
ESA.
51
  The court therefore ordered the State to remove the sheep.
52
  
Congress reacted in 1982 by adding Section 10(a) to the ESA to allow for 
the incidental take of a species.
53
  This small retreat from the absolute 
 
taking based on significant modification of endangered species habitat did not occur 
until 1990, seventeen years after the ESA was passed.”). 
 46. Uchitel, supra n. 45, at 262. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 16 U.S.C. at § 1539(a). 
 49. Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
 50. Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 295. 
 51. Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t. of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293 (“Prior to the Palila cases in 1979 and 1981, 
the only court to consider the application of Section 9 to habitat impacts adopted a 
limited reading of the section’s reach.”). 
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prohibition on take has allowed the FWS to fashion creative programs that 
allow for limited take of a species in exchange for conservation 
commitments from landowners. 
III. THE INABILITY OF THE ESA TO PROTECT UNLISTED 
SPECIES PRIOR TO LISTING 
A weakness in the ESA is the lack of authority to take actions that 
would prevent the listing of a species in decline.  By the time a species is 
almost extinct, the cost of recovery is much higher.  Taking action before 
it is too late would decrease the overall cost to landowners and the 
government. 
A. The ESA incentivizes landowners to prevent listed or declining species 
from occupying their land 
Private land is free from regulation under the ESA unless a listed 
species, or its designated critical habitat, can be found on his land.
54
  
Therefore, it is relatively easy for a landowner to evade the ESA by 
eliminating the species’ habitat from his land.  This will remove the 
species or prevent it from recolonizing land that was once part of its range.  
This evasive action involves exactly what the law was intended to avoid 
— the destruction of an endangered species’ habitat.
55
  As the National 
Association of Home Builders explains in their Developer’s Guide to 
Endangered Species Regulation: 
[T]he highest level of assurance that a property owner will 
not face an ESA issue is to maintain the property in a 
condition such that protected species cannot occupy the 
property.  . . .  This is referred to as the “scorched earth” 
technique.
56
 
 
 54. Barton H. Thompson, Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private 
Role, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 245, 295 (2002–2003). 
 55. Dean Lueck and Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 J.L. & Econ. 27, 28 (Apr. 2003). 
 56. National Association of Home Builders, Developer’s Guide to 
Endangered Species Regulation, 109 (Home Builder Press 1996). 
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The cost to a landowner of allowing an endangered species to 
occupy their land creates an incentive to make it inhospitable for 
vulnerable species.  A possible solution to this problem that involves 
punishing preemptive habitat destruction is suggested below. 
B. The ESA prevents landowners from taking beneficial actions that might 
have short-term negative impacts 
The ESA imposes an absolute prohibition on the unpermitted take 
of a listed species.
57
  However, sometimes an action taken to improve 
habitat for a listed species will result in a limited, but illegal, take of the 
species.  For example, the Montana DNRC listed the ability to remove 
culverts to restore stream connectivity and reduce sedimentation as one of 
their priorities for protecting the endangered Bull Trout.
58
  However, the 
removal of the culverts would be illegal because it would result in the 
temporary impairment of the stream and result in the nominal “take of the 
species.
59
   
IV. PROGRAMS CREATED TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY FOR 
LANDOWNERS AND PROTECT VULNERABLE SPECIES 
Except for the drafters of the law, almost no one understood how 
powerful the ESA would be when it was enacted.  However, because it is 
such a powerful law, people have been fighting to repeal or modify it from 
day one.
60
  Efforts to avoid the strictures of the law have come in many 
forms: attempts to repeal the law, legislation to defund the FWS’s 
authority to list new species or designate critical habitat, and non-
enforcement.
61
  In response to these criticisms, the FWS has created 
 
 57. 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1). 
 58. Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Forested 
State Trust Lands Habitat Conservation Plan: Final EIS, vol. 1, p. 3–31 (Sep. 2010) 
(available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/mepa2010/
dnr0923_2010001a.pdf). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Keith W. Rizzardi, The Duty to Advise the Lorax: Environmental 
Advocacy and the Risk of Reform, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 25, 57 
(2012) (available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol37/iss13). 
 61. Id. 
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programs that allow landowners to act proactively to conserve their land 
and avoid Section 9 liability while protecting listed species.
62
 
A. Habitat Conservation Plans 
As discussed above, in 1982, the rigidity of Section 9 prompted 
Congress to amend the ESA to add Section 10(a).
63
  This allows a 
landowner who thinks their actions may harm a listed species to develop a 
conservation plan and obtain an ITP to avoid an illegal take of the 
species.
64
  The conservation plan must identify the likely impacts on the 
species and the measures the permit applicant is willing to undertake to 
minimize and mitigate those impacts.
65
  These conservation plans have 
come to be known as “habitat conservation plans” or “HCPs.”  In 1996, 
the FWS issued “detailed but flexible guidelines” for drafting an HCP and 
obtaining an ITP.
66
 
The  five criteria for approving an HCP are: 
(1) the take will be incidental; (2) the applicant will, to the 
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the 
impacts of the taking; (3) the applicant will ensure 
adequate funding for the plan; (4) the take will not 
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and 
recovery of the species in the wild; and (5) any other 
measures FWS may require.
67
 
These criteria are important because the FWS must approve an 
HCP and issue the applicant an ITP if these conditions are met,.
68
  
Determining what level of mitigation efforts is the “maximum amount 
practical” is important but difficult because an HCP will always allow 
some level of impact on a listed species that could be further reduced 
 
 62. 16 U.S.C. at § 1539(a). 
 63. Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293 
 64. Lamer, supra n. 10, at 38. 
 65. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 66. FWS, Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit 
Processing Handbook 3–38 (Nov. 4, 1996) (available at http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPBKTOC.PDF). 
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
 68. Id. 
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towards zero.  The case law is not clear on the issue, but at a minimum, 
the FWS must state what additional mitigation efforts it considered and 
why it rejected those additional measures as impracticable.
69
 
One criticism of the HCP process is the relatively low level of 
conservation measures that are required to obtain an ITP.
70
  By definition, 
an ITP allows for the “take” of a listed species or the destruction of its 
habitat.  All that an applicant must show is that the impact on the species 
“will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the 
species in the wild.”
71
  This is not a high threshold and it could allow a 
species to slip through the cracks.  One suggestion to improve the process 
would be to require the application to prove that the project will provide a 
net conservation benefit for the covered species.  Granting an ITP is a 
matter of administrative grace and more should be asked of an applicant in 
exchange for immunizing the applicant from liability under the ESA. 
B. Candidate Conservation Agreements 
Candidate Conservation Agreements (CCA) are formal voluntary 
agreements between the FWS and one or more parties.  The purpose of a 
CCA is to address the conservation needs of candidate species and other 
unlisted species in decline.
72
  Because a landowner does not receive 
protections from future ESA enforcement, CCAs have been used mostly 
by federal agencies and Indian tribes.
73
  Federal agencies are not eligible 
for the assurances discussed below because that would negate their 
mandatory duty under Section 7 to consult with the FWS before taking 
any action that might adversely affect a listed species.
74
 
 
 69. See e.g. National Wildlife Federation v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 
1292 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding the FWS had acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner when it did not consider an alternative involving greater mitigation measures). 
 70. John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plans for Species 
Recovery: An Introduction to a Series of Articles on Habitat Conservation Plans, 27 
Envtl. L. 755, 757 (1997). 
 71. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
 72. FWS, Candidate Conservation Agreements (Mar. 2011) (available at 
http://www.fws.gov/Endangered./esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf) [hereinafter FWS, 
Candidate Conservation Agreements]. 
 73. Phelps, supra n. 7, at 175. 
 74. 16 U.S.C. § 1535. 
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C. Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances 
The FWS developed Candidate Conservation Agreements with 
Assurances (CCAA) to address landowners’ desires to obtain assurances 
that they will not have to take additional measures when the species is 
later listed if they comply with the terms of the CCAA.
75
  This program 
gives non-Federal landowners incentives to voluntarily implement 
conservation measures to protect candidate species on their land.
76
  There 
are several assurances that a CCAA provides.  First, the level of 
conservation measures that the landowner will be required to undertake is 
set when the CCAA is approved and cannot be modified when the species 
is later listed, even if the CCAA was based on incorrect assumptions about 
the species.
77
  Second, the landowner is immune from liability under 
Section 9 for the activities approved in the CCAA.
78
 
To receive these assurances, an applicant must prove that the 
conservation measures in the proposed CCAA would preclude the need to 
list the species if combined with the same level of conservation measures 
on all other properties throughout the specie’s range.
79
  To determine 
whether a CCAA meets this standard, the FWS looks for reductions in 
threats to the species on the property, the degree to which the conservation 
benefits offset the impacts from any take that might occur, and the 
hypothetical effects of conservation measures on the other properties.
80
  
For candidate species, the FWS assesses the degree to which the 
conservation measures in the CCAA address the factors in the five listing 
factors discussed above.
81
  For non-candidate species, the FWS conducts a 
 
 75. FWS, Candidate Conservation Agreements, supra n. 72. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. FWS, Draft Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances 
Handbook 14 (June 2003) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
pdf/handbooktext.pdf). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Amelia Orton-Palmer, Candidate Conservation Agreements and 
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances under the ESA, 2 Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Paper No. 9 (2012) (available at http://
trove.nla.gov.au/result?q=amelia%20palmer). 
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similar analysis based on the best information available on the species and 
its threats.
82
 
When there is less information about a species, the decision on the 
amount of conservation measures to require in order to obtain the 
protections of a CCAA is more speculative.  This could result in the FWS 
making a commitment that last for decades based on incorrect 
information.  As discussed below, the requirement for approving a CCAA 
should be amended to require the FWS to apply the precautionary 
principle before granting these irrevocable assurances. 
D. Safe Harbor Agreements 
Safe Harbor Agreements (SHA) provide regulatory assurances for 
landowners who voluntarily agree to aid in the recovery of listed species 
by improving or increasing the amount of habitat on their land.  As part of 
a SHA, a landowner agrees to improve their land to benefit a listed species 
for a set amount of time.
83
  Once the period is over, the landowner may 
restore his land to its baseline condition without risking violating Section 
9, even if it results in the “take” of the species or the destruction of 
habitat.
84
 
E. Conservation Banking 
One of the more innovative new programs that the FWS has 
developed is the conservation-banking program.
85
  A conservation bank is 
a tract of land that is permanently protected and actively managed to 
benefit an endangered species.  The land in the conservation bank is used 
to offset the loss of similar habitat elsewhere.
86
  Conservation banking is a 
free-market approach based on the limited supply of land suitable for 
conservation.
87
  Credits are given to a landowner who enters into a 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. FWS, Safe Harbor Agreements for Private Landowners (July 2011) 
(available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/harborqa.pdf). 
 84. Id. 
 85. FWS, Conservation Banking: Incentives for Stewardship (Aug. 2012) 
(available at http://www.fws.gov/endangeredesa-library/pdf/
conservation_banking.pdf). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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conservation bank agreement with the FWS to protect and manage their 
land for one or more listed species.
88
  The protections are permanent and 
must be funded by a self-sustaining endowment.
89
  Other landowners in 
the area who are proposing a project that will affect a listed species may 
purchase the conservation credits in order to comply with the ESA.
90
  
Conservation banking benefits the species by allowing development on 
several smaller tracts but creating one larger tract that is actively managed 
to protect the species.
91
 
These agreements have several advantages.  They increase 
ecosystem connectivity because, in exchange for allowing multiple 
isolated parcels to be modified, a larger tract of land is protected as a 
single unit.
92
  They also allow for a one-time reduction in a species or its 
habitat in exchange for permanently protected habitat for the remaining 
members of the species.
93
  Conservation banking is not a new concept, 
instead, the FWS modeled it after the popular wetland mitigation banks 
that are part of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
94
  The idea that a 
person may pay money to harm an endangered species is a large departure 
from the original ideals of the ESA.  An interesting example of combining 
conservation banking with an HCP is the agreement between TransCanada 
and FWS.
95
  This agreement allows TransCanada to comply with the ESA 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. FWS, ESA Basics, supra n. 8, at 1. 
 92. FWS, Conservation Banking, supra n. 85. 
 93. J. B. Ruhl, Alan Glen, and David Hartman, Practical Guide to Habitat 
Conservation Banking Law and Policy, 20 Nat. Resources & Env. 26 (2005-2006). 
 94. FWS, Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of 
Conservation Banks 2 (May 2, 2003) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
esa-library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf) (“The main concept behind 
wetland mitigation banking is similar to that of conservation banking; to provide 
compensation for adverse impacts to wetlands and other aquatic resources in advance 
of the impact.  Under the guidelines established for section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, impacts to wetlands are 
mitigated sequentially by avoiding impacts, minimizing impacts, and then, as a last 
resort, compensating for those impacts.”). 
 95. Enercon Services, Draft Habitat Conservation Plan TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline, LP: Gulf Coast Project (Aug. 15, 2012) (available at http://
www.fws.gov/southwest/es/Oklahoma/Documents/ABB/
Final%20Draft%20Keystone%20HCP%2020120815.pdf). 
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while it constructed and operates the southern portion of the Keystone XL 
pipeline between Cushing, Oklahoma and Nederland, Texas, which will 
result in the “take” American burying beetles (an endangered species).
96
  
In addition to mitigation and avoidance measures, the HCP calls for 
TransCanada to purchase a 1,600-acre tract of land to act as substitute 
habitat for the American burying beetle habitat that was lost during 
constriction phase.
97
  TransCanada paid a third-party conservation group 
three-million-dollars to operate the conservation bank for perpetuity.
98
  If 
the impacts of the project on the beetle are not as large as expected, 
TransCanada will be able to sell the excess American burying beetle 
impact credits to other developers.
99
 
The conservation-banking concept is new, and it has not been 
toughly tested in the courts.  However, if we are willing to accept the idea 
that it is okay to put a price tag on our most vulnerable species, the free 
market may provide a path to recovery that the original blanket prohibition 
on take in the ESA was unable to provide. 
V. THE ABILITY FOR SPECIES TO FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS 
The FWS has been successful in fulfilling Congress’ mandate to 
provide flexibility in the application of the ESA.  Using its strong 
bargaining position, the FWS is able to construct agreements with 
landowners while remaining consistent with the “no jeopardy” provision 
of the ESA.
100
  This flexibility, however, might be the crack in the 
roadblock that allows for more extinctions.  With minor modifications, 
these programs could be reinforced to ensure that a species does not fall 
through the regulatory cracks. 
 
 96. Id. at 3. 
 97. TransCanada, Keystone McAlester Conservation Area American 
Burying Beetle Permittee Responsible Conservation Plan 3 (Nov. 16, 2012) (available 
at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/OklahomaDocuments/TE_Species/Keystone
/HCP%20Appendix%20B%20KMCA%20Conservation%20Plan.pdf). 
 98. FWS, Agreement between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. 
Department of State, and TransCanada Keystone Pipeline 3 (no date) (available at 
http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/181193.pdf). 
 99. TransCanada, supra n. 97, at 8. 
 100. Uchitel, supra n. 45, at 262. 
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A. The need to codify the precautionary principle in the ESA 
In order to entice landowners to voluntarily take preemptive 
actions to protect vulnerable species, there must be a benefit to the 
landowners to take action.  Currently, the FWS offers several incentives 
for landowner cooperation, including issuance of ITPs and providing 
assurances that no additional commitments of resources will be required if 
they comply with the terms of the permit.
101
  This compromise from the 
ideal of preventing all “take” of a listed species is reasonable and 
necessary if we, as a society, want landowners to be proactive about 
protecting species and habitat conservation.  However, there is the 
possibility for not only intentional exploitation of these exceptions, but 
also for unintended consequences.  , Congress acknowledged that science 
often lags behind development when it enacted the ESA and made the 
decision to place the survival of endangered species as the  “highest of 
priorities.” 
The precautionary principle’s requirement to take small steps until 
there is scientific certainty should be explicitly incorporated into the ITP 
approval process.  With endangered species, a small mistake in allowing 
the take of a species or the modification of its habitat can have long lasting 
consequences.  The maxim “first, do no harm” should be our nation’s 
guiding principle when allowing landowners to “take” an endangered 
species or species in rapid decline. 
B. Set a floor for scientific knowledge about a species before granting 
assurances 
The requirement to show that a project will not jeopardize the 
survival of a species — especially when there is limited scientific 
knowledge about the species — is a low threshold to meet.  However, that 
is all that is currently required to get a permit to take a vulnerable species 
for decades.  This threshold is even lower with unlisted species that are in 
rapid decline because there is even less known about them. 
There should be a requirement to obtain a minimum level of 
scientific knowledge about the species that will be affected by a project, 
including their habitat, place in the food chain, population trend, and 
resilience to change, before the FWS makes any long-term commitments.  
 
 101. See the programs discussed in Section IV. 
CONNORS.11.24 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2014  10:05 PM 
2014 CONSERVING HABITAT BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE 165 
The FWS requires some level of knowledge about a species before taking 
action, but the level of inquiry is determined on a case-by-case basis.  If 
there was a set minimum level of knowledge about a species as a pre-
condition to applying for a permit, applicants would know what was 
expected of them and the FWS could make better decisions.  It would also 
create an incentive for collaboration between landowners, 
conservationists, and local governments to build up a greater knowledge 
of species in the area.  Increasing the knowledge about a species provides 
benefits not only to the species, but also to the ecosystem as a whole. 
C. Punish preemptive habitat destruction 
Landowners find it too easy to avoid the ESA by destroying 
habitat on their land solely to prevent a vulnerable species from occupying 
it.  This evasive action is exactly what the law was intended to avoid.  The 
ESA could be amended to punish landowners who destroy habitat solely 
to drive away a listed species.  This is not to say that the federal 
government should be involved in every land-use planning decision.  
Landowners should be free to use their land however they choose, but 
when a person’s only motivation for destroying the very habitat that a 
species needs to survive is to avoid regulation under the ESA, they are 
also avoiding their shared responsibility as a citizen of the nation.  
Preventing the extinction of endangered species is everyone’s 
responsibility, and a landowner should not be allowed to place additional 
burdens on his neighbors by eliminating the habitat on his land. 
Although proving a landowner intentionally destroyed habitat to 
avoid the ESA may be difficult, there would be cases when the 
circumstantial evidence was so strong that it would be possible.  And the 
simple fact that destroying habitat to displace a vulnerable species is 
illegal would prevent parties like the National Association of 
Homebuilders from proposing this as a viable alternative. 
D. Categorical exclusions for proven beneficial activities 
As a roadblock statute, Congress designed the ESA to impose an 
absolute prohibition on the unpermitted “take” of a listed species.  
However, sometimes this prevents conservation minded parties from 
taking actions to improve habitat for those species.  One way to encourage 
landowners to take actions that will  benefit a species, but might result in a 
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limited amount of harm, would be to create a categorical exclusion for 
these types of actions. 
A way to implement this process with limited administrative 
overhead would be to allow a landowner to file a “notice of beneficial 
action with the possibility of incidental take” with the FWS.  In the notice, 
the landowner would explain his plan and why the benefits to the species 
far outweigh the amount of harm.  Once filed with the FWS, the 
landowner could proceed with the action without waiting for approval.  
The FWS would have the documentation that it needs to follow up to 
ensure that the impacts were as limited, and the benefits as large, as 
claimed in the notice.  If the landowner misrepresented the extent of the 
take, the FWS could invalidate the permit and prosecute the landowner 
under Section 9.  If the landowner complied with the terms of the notice of 
beneficial take, and the contents of notice of the complied with the 
regulations, they would be protected. 
A categorical exclusion would lower the costs to landowners who 
want to improve habitat for endangered species.  This idea may be 
controversial, but we have to make tough choices to advance habitat 
conservation.  Although it could be subject to fraud, the FWS would know 
where to look for abuses and who was responsible. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The FWS is doing a good job of using its freedom to craft creative 
solutions to advance the policies of the ESA.  While these programs are 
new, they tend to be the least controversial parts of the law.  This 
willingness to experiment should be encouraged, but the FWS should 
remember that preventing the decline of vulnerable species and preserving 
habitat should be the goal of any project that it approves.  To that end, 
modest advancements could ensure there are effective sideboards on the 
FWS authority. 
Every species and ecosystem is different, and the FWS must retain 
the flexibility to design programs that address the circumstances on the 
ground.  When presented with a minimum level scientific knowledge 
about a species the FWS will be able to negotiate agreements that are 
more accurate.  With enhanced authority to punish preemptive habitat 
destruction, there will be more habitat and the costs of recovery will be 
more equitably shared.  Finally, enacting a categorical exclusion that 
allows a landowner to file a notice of intent to improve habitat for an 
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endangered species would be a small step towards making it easier for 
landowners to do the right thing while lowering the costs of compliance. 
 
